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Patterns of multi-party
government: Viability and
compatibility of coalitions
Hans Keman
Abstract
Coalition theory is central to our understanding of the nexus between party system development,
party government composition and the relationship between the executive and legislature.
I argue that government formation is crucial for understanding the life cycle of party
government. I consider the relations between parties in parliament and parties in government as
principalagent relations, signifying the indirect character of representative governance. The study
of (coalition) government should not be a one-shot game and not be conducted without taking
into account its contextual variation or the time dimension: the coalition praxis to form a new
government is not only a post-electoral ‘game’ conducted within parliament and government
between parties, but also a serious exercise by parties to translate policy preferences into a viable
agreement that honours, by and large, the voters’ choices. The comparative analysis of 17
established parliamentary democracies after 1990 serves to illustrate these points.
Keywords
coalition theory, party responsiveness, party systems, representative government
Introduction: Coalition politics and democratic theory
In the majority of the established parliamentary democracies, the politics of
coalition formation is crucial to understanding how the relationship between the
executive and legislative is shaped by the way party government operates.1 As is
documented elsewhere, the process of government formation and its actual outcomes
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determine by and large both the viability and policy performance of party
government.2
However, it is often overlooked that coalition politics and party government are
essential to understanding how legitimately parliamentary democracy functions in terms
of ‘representative government’. This type of democracy is considered to be indirect,
meaning that the citizen-cum-elector is the principal and its representatives (the parties
and their candidates) are the agents. Equally indirect is the process of coalition govern-
ment, since it is the parties represented in parliament that are responsible for making and
breaking any type of party government (with the exception of single-party government in
a two-party system like the UK until 2010 and New Zealand until 1994). In other words,
multi-party government is an institution with delegated powers and is formed on the
basis of negotiations between parliamentary parties after the elections have taken place.
Hence the politics of forming coalition government is conducted by parties that at the
same time must ‘command and control’ as a principal the policy-making actions of its
self-appointed agent: party government.3 All this implies that in indirect forms of
democracy4 political parties have a dual and often conflicting role, being both agent and
principal.5
Organizational theory tells us that there are minimally two conditions required to
make a principal–agent relationship work: (1) trust, and (2) effective control. Note,
however, that ‘trust’ can imply trust in a person (politicians) or in the institutions
and their performance. Hence the formation of representative government in par-
liamentary democracies implies that the population (i.e. the electorate) trusts its
agents, i.e. the political parties, and must have confidence in these parties not only
to follow the mandate received through elections (e.g. the policy programme or
electoral manifesto), but also to form a government that is more or less represen-
tative and effectively conducting its business according to the ‘rules’ (institutions)
of the game. In normative terms this often means ‘good governance’, i.e. a party
government that is ‘responsive’ and ‘accountable’. Responsiveness is conceptualized
as transforming the ‘people’s will’ into public policy according to the electoral
pledges of parties and in particular those in government. Accountability defines the
institutional role of parties in parliament in controlling party government with
2 Hans Keman, ‘Policy-Making Capacities of European Party Government’, in Kurt. R. Luther
and Ferdinand Mu¨ller-Rommel (eds), Political Parties in the New Europe (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002).
3 Hans Keman, ‘Centre-Space Politics: Party Behaviour in Multi-Party Systems’, in Hans
Keman (ed.), The Politics of Problem-Solving in Postwar Democracies (Houndmills: Macmil-
lan, 1997); Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Mu¨ller and Torbjo¨rn Bergman (eds), Delegation and
Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
4 Or, to use Dahl’s term, ‘polyarchy’. Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2000).
5 Thomas Saalfeld, ‘Members of Parliament and Governments in Western Europe: Agency
Relations and Problems of Oversight’, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 37, no. 3
(2000), pp. 35376.
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regard to their policy performance.6 The higher the degree of responsiveness and the
more accountable government is – so the argument goes  the better an indirect
type of democracy performs.7
Obviously this approach departs from an ‘ideal-type’ using normative ideas as they
developed over time and called the liberal type of democracy.8 It is also obvious that in
reality the norms of this model are hardly ever met.9 But this article is not an attempt to
discuss this issue, nor to (dis)prove it by means of empirical analysis. What I set out to
discuss here is to what extent the politics of coalition sheds light on the process of party
government formation in terms of ‘representative’ government as part of democratic theory
by focusing on the degree of ‘responsiveness’ of the government eventually formed as an
outcome of the coalition negotiations between parties after the election. In part this will not
only show the importance of coalition theory per se, but also the weight of government
formation and the resulting types of party government in view of democratic theory.10
The article is structured as follows: first I sketch the changing political landscape that
took place around the 1990s. I view this period as a change towards less trust in politics due
in large part to socio-economic change in most OECD countries, eventually influencing
party behaviour and government formation. In the second section I present information
on the different approaches in coalition theory to account for the variations of governments
formed. I contend that coalition theory is still a work in progress and will offer some ideas
on how to improve it. The next section deals with the life cycle of the different types of
party government in view of their institutional design, focusing on the organization of gov-
ernance and the relations with their principal (i.e. parliament). Finally, I examine represen-
tative quality in terms of the responsiveness of the party system and party government.
Societal change, political consequences and
party governance
Since the late 1980s dramatic political and economic change has occurred across the
OECD, affecting most established democracies. For example, in Europe the single
market was introduced in 1986 followed by the foundation of the EU as an explicit
transnational organization in 1992. At the same time OECD members faced a
slowdown in international trade combined with de-industrialization and rising levels
of unemployment. The Cold War ended abruptly in 1989 followed by the emergence
6 Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Form and Performance in Thirty-Six
Countries (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999); Manfred G. Schmidt, Demok-
rathietheorien: Eine Einfu¨hrung, 4th rev. edn (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2005).
7 P. Mair, ‘Democracy Beyond Parties’, 2005, UC Irvine: Centre for the Study of Democracy,
available at: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/3vs886v9; Hans Keman, Parties and Govern-
ment: Incumbency and Representation in Parliamentary Democracies, Acta Politica, vol. 46
(2010), pp. 324.
8 Dahl, Democracy and its Critics.
9 David Held, Models of Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006).
10 Michael Laver and Kenneth A Shepsle, Making and Breaking Governments (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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of another world order, manifested in the First Gulf War and military intervention in
the former Yugoslavia by NATO. Also, inter alia, due to the rise of neo-liberalism,
the retrenchment of the welfare state became a salient policy issue.11 Finally, the
internationalization of domestic economies became a prime policy concern, compel-
ling parties to revisit their policy priorities.12
This changing domestic and international political context forced parties to reconsider
their programmatic outlook and policy preferences (i.e. policy-seeking behaviour) and
also their mode of electoral competition (i.e. vote-seeking behaviour). Most notably the
parties of the ‘centre’13 tended to move even closer to the relative centre of the respective
party systems, allowing new parties to emerge successfully – on both the left and the
right of the party system spectrum.14
In short, macro-political and socio-economic developments seem to be related to
shifting loyalties within electorates and are conducive to a change in vote-seeking beha-
viour of the established parties as well as in the policy-seeking behaviour of the ‘pivot’
parties  parties dominating the centre in multi-party systems.15 Obviously this also
implied that political parties had to (re)consider how to develop a viable strategy to gain
and maintain access to government under these circumstances. In addition, traditional
parties had to (re)think their extant strategies with respect to controlling party govern-
ment in terms of its policy-making capacities vis-a`-vis the new parties that had
11 See Paul Pierson, ‘Coping with Permanent Austerity: Welfare Restructuring in Affluent
Societies’, in Paul Pierson (ed.), The New Politics of the Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001); Hans Keman, ‘Explaining Miracles: Third Ways and Work and
Welfare’, West European Politics, vol. 26, no. 2 (2003); Klaus Armingeon and Giuliano
Bonoli (eds), The Politics of Post Industrial Welfare States: Adapting Postwar Social Pol-
icies to New Social Risks (London: Routledge, 2006).
12 F. G. Castles (ed.), The Disappearing State? Retrenchment Realities in an Age of Globali-
sation (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007); Keman, ‘Parties and Government’.
13 These parties included Social Democrats. See Herbert Kitschelt, ‘European Social Democ-
racy between Political Economy and Competition’, in Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary
Marks and John D. Stephens (eds), Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Hans Keman and Paul Pennings, ‘Com-
petition and Coalescence: Social Democracy and Christian Democracy Moving into the 21st
Century’, Swiss Political Science Review, vol. 12, no. 2 (2006), pp. 95126.
14 Peter Mair, ‘In the Aggregate: Mass Electoral Behaviour in Western Europe, 19502000’, in
Keman, Comparative Democratic Politics; Hans Keman and Andre´ Krouwel, ‘The Rise of a
New Political Class? Emerging New Parties and the Populist Challenge in Western Europe’,
Working Papers Political Science, No. 2006/02 (Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit, 2006).
15 Hans Keman, ‘The Search for the Centre: Pivot Parties in West European Party Systems’,
West European Politics, vol. 17, no. 4 (1994), pp. 12448; Peter Van Roozendaal, ‘The
Effect of Dominant and Centre Parties on Cabinet Composition and Durability’, in Keman,
The Politics of Problem-Solving in Postwar Democracies; Reuven Y. Harzan, Centre Par-
ties: Polarisation and Competition in European Parliamentary Democracies (London:
Continuum, 1997).
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entered the various party systems.16 Finally, and not unimportantly, in most cases the
rules of the political game have changed since the 1990s, affecting party behaviour and
the format and functioning of party government in particular.17 Table 1 notes these
recent electoral and party system changes.
Table 1 reveals that there has been both de-alignment and re-alignment of the electors
in most parliamentary democracies. Except for Denmark and Spain, lower turnout rates
can be noticed (6.0 per cent). Electoral volatility, indicating changing voters, rose by
4.2 per cent or more on average in a number of polities: Austria, Italy, the Netherlands,
New Zealand and Norway. With the exception of New Zealand, these countries were
Table 1. Electoral and party system features in representative democracies (19862006) (%)
Country TurnOut ChangeTO Volatility ChangeEV VotesNP ChangeNP ParSupport
Australia 94.8 1.7 3.7 1.8 2.7 1.8 55.8
Austria 84.3 7.3 21.1 15.6 34.1 17.1 76.7
Belgium 91.9 3.0 12.8 5.5 24.2 13.1 63.2
Denmark 87.1 1.5 13.3 3.6 10.1 2.4 40.6
Finland 69.6 9.1 11.0 2.3 7.3 4.6 52.8
France 64.4 7.5 12.6 6.6 21.2 15.0 62.7
Germany 80.3 6.8 7.8 1.5 11.8 3.5 55.1
Greece 77.4 6.1 6.2 5.1 4.2 2.8 54.4
Ireland 62.7 10.2 8.5 6.0 0.0 0.0 50.9
Italy 86.0 8.8 22.0 13.4 32.8 15.7 53.5
Netherlands 79.5 4.0 23.4 15.1 10.8 8.7 61.8
New Zealand 82.5 10.4 18.6 5.3 5.3 0.8 52.6
Norway 75.5 7.6 16.1 5.4 25.0 21.0 47.1
Portugal 61.5 16.5 8.3 6.7 13.1 3.3 52.7
Spain 77.2 3.7 9.6 4.6 0.0 0.0 49.8
Sweden 80.1 9.0 13.9 6.3 6.2 4.0 37.4
Switzerland 45.2 3.0 8.7 2.3 11.3 2.7 80.6
Average 76.5 6.0 12.8 4.2 12.9 6.1 55.7
Average ¼ Cross-national average (N ¼ 17). Sources: Mair, ‘In the Aggregate’; K. Armingeon, S. Engler,
P. Potolidis, M. Marle`ne Gerber and P. Leimgruber, Comparative Political Data Set I, available at: www.ipw.uni
be.ch/unibe/wiso/ipw/content/e2425/e2426/e3672/e5109/files5111/CPDSI Codebook1960-2009UPDATE
ger.pdf; Jaap Woldendorp, Hans Keman and Ian Budge, Party Government in 48 Democracies (19451998): Com-
position – Duration Personnel (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000) and updates; see also www/
ipu.org: Inter-Parliamentary Union.
TurnOut ¼ Electoral participation
Volatility ¼ Electoral volatility
NP ¼ New parties
ParSupport ¼ Parliamentary support of government
16 Mair, ‘In the Aggregate: Mass Electoral Behaviour in Western Europe, 19502000’; Keman
and Krouwel, ‘The Rise of a New Political Class?’
17 Rudy Andeweg, ‘Coalition Politics in the Netherlands: From Accommodation to Politici-
zation’, Acta Publica, vol. 43 (2008), pp. 25477.
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known for their high levels of political stability by means of consensus mechanisms.18
Yet the level of electoral volatility is presently hovering around the 12.8 per cent mark
and is closely related to higher levels of voting for new parties (around 12.9 per cent).
This rise in electoral volatility has been conducive to new forms of electoral
competition, not only between established parties but in competition with new parties
and within party families. For a few countries, like Italy and New Zealand, this change
was reinforced by changes to their electoral system. Both polities chose to introduce the
German Mixed Member system (MMP) that resulted in a changed party system. In Italy
it produced a complete overhaul, whereas in New Zealand the two-party system
developed into a multi-party system while retaining two dominant parties (see Miller and
Curtin in this issue).
It can be concluded therefore that the conditions regarding the formation and compo-
sition of party government in a range of democracies has been affected by changes after the
1990s. Although the established ‘political class’ still appears to have sufficient resources to
remain in power, the conditions are changing and the corresponding dominance in party
government appears to be fading. Thequestion that is begging for an answer is towhat extent
these changing conditions have affected the formation and composition of party govern-
ment. What change has taken place in terms of type of government and its composition?
Howdid changing party behaviour affect government formation and functioning in terms of
duration and termination?Andwhat are the patterned variations of party government across
the OECD and what do these changes signify in terms of responsiveness?
The literature on government formation suggests two plausible answers to these
questions:
First, party behaviour appears more flexible and adaptive in terms of office-seeking
behaviour than many observers often believe, and allows for new patterns of
government formation.19 However, there is a limit to flexible behaviour, as the
Belgian case illustrates (where the process of government formation had been run-
ning for more than 300 days at the time of writing).
Second, the existing institutional conditions appear to be often more beneficial to
large(r) parties and often seem to function as ‘veto points’ to change and inno-
vation.20 Yet, again there is a limit to this, as was apparent in Italy and New
Zealand in the early 1990s when institutional changes took place to ‘break’ the
conceived power of the central or dominant parties.
18 For this see Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, p 265.
19 Richard Katz, ‘Party Government: A Rationalistic Conception’, in Francis G. Castles and
Rudolf Wildenmann (eds), Visions and Realities of Party Government (Berlin: de Gruyter,
1986); Hans Keman, ‘Party Government Formation and Policy Preferences: An Encom-
passing Approach?’, in Alan Weale and Judith Bara (eds), Democracy, Parties and Elections
(London: Routledge, 2006).
20 M. G. Schmidt, ‘The Impact of Political Parties, Constitutional Structures and Veto Players’,
in Keman, Comparative Democratic Politics, pp. 16685.
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Obviously each approach induces different answers: the former is derived from an
actor-oriented perspective focusing on behavioural patterns, whereas the latter considers
the institutional design of a polity as explaining the paradox of ‘centre’ parties steadily
losing their vote share in elections and yet often controlling in the game of government
formation.21 Both perspectives will be analysed here.
The game of government formation: rules, representation,
parties
Government formation in parliamentary democracies is naturally a crucial stage for all
parties involved. The formation game is not only important as regards ‘who gets what,
when and how’,22 but also because the result determines to what extent the people’s
representatives (i.e. parties in parliament) participate in the executive. Hence, elections
are vital not only to changes of party government, but also to how executive powers are
(re)distributed among parties in parliament, for the underlying idea on indirect demo-
cratic representation is that the relative change in electoral strength of a party is reflected
in more or fewer executive powers subsequently.23
Representative government can institutionally be considered as a delegation of par-
liament.24 At the same time it is conventional wisdom that government is formed by
parties representing the majority in parliament, or is tolerated by the majority if it is a
minority government. In short, the fundamental prerequisite for forming party govern-
ment (be it by a single party, a majority coalition or a minority government) is to gain and
maintain the support of the majority in parliament (see Table 1 for the extent to which
this is the case across the countries under review). From this it follows that the variation
in types of government indicates the extent to which executive powers are concentrated
in a few parties or is shared among a number of parties. The type of government thus
indicates the degree of parliamentary representation in government. Additionally, so the
argument goes, the type of government and its support indicates its life cycle in terms of
duration (or rate of survival, i.e. the proportion of the maximum time a government
survives the legislative period; see Table 2). Although in many cases this cycle is
concurrent with the electoral cycle, this is certainly not always the case, and governments
may be terminated earlier for reasons other than regular elections. Again, more often
than not the types of government formed show variations in life cycle. Hence, it must be
concluded that our understanding of the game of government formation is still limited
and, more importantly, more complex than is often suggested. Let us therefore have
a closer look at how coalition theory has developed.
21 Keman, ‘Parties and Government’.
22 Harold Laski, Parliamentary Government in England (New York: Viking Press, 1938).
23 Katz, ‘Party Government: A Rationalistic Conception’; Ian Budge and Hans Keman, Parties
and Democracies: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in 20 States (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1990); Michael D. McDonald and Ian Budge, Elections, Parties,
Democracy: Conferring the Median Mandate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
24 Strøm et al., Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies.
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Coalition theory developed as early as the 1940s by means of formal modelling.
These approaches informed by rational choice have been further elaborated and applied
to explain the outcomes of government formation.25 The actual outcomes, however, did
not strongly support the formal approaches (see Table 3). In fact the types of government
indicating power concentration only account for a minority of cases under review here.
In other words theories oriented towards office-seeking are insufficient to explain the
actual distribution and therefore the underlying mechanisms of the game of government
Table 2. Features of party government’s life cycle
Country Type of government Reason of termination Rate of survival Rate of innovation
Australia 1.4 1.11 0.80 10.0
Austria 2.0 1.78 0.61 22.7
Belgium 2.5 2.33 0.50 22.0
Denmark 4.1 2.63 0.59 39.2
Finland 3.6 2.11 0.58 91.7
France 3.2 3.14 0.40 13.5
Germany 2.7 1.89 0.64 11.8
Greece 1.2 1.56 0.46 10.0
Ireland 2.7 2.50 0.45 62.6
Italy 3.7 3.00 0.24 41.5
Netherlands 3.3 2.11 0.67 37.1
New Zealand 2.3 2.08 0.65 50.0
Norway 3.2 1.83 0.48 24.3
Portugal 2.3 1.64 0.65 0.0
Spain 2.0 1.13 0.82 66.7
Sweden 3.3 2.00 0.48 29.6
Switzerland 2.9 1.00 1.00 0.0
Averages 2.7 1.99 0.59 31.3
Mode 2.0 2.11 0.48 0.0
Type of government: scale running from 1 to 5; 1 ¼ single party government; 2 ¼ minimal winning coalition
type; 3 ¼ surplus coalition ¼ more parties than needed; 4 ¼ single party minority government; 5 ¼ multi-
party minority coalition.
Reason of termination: scale running from 1 to 5; 1 ¼ regular election; 2 ¼ resignation of PM; 3 ¼ dissension
between executive and legislature; 4 ¼ conflict within government; 5 ¼ intervention of head of state.
Rate of survival: percentage of time in office proportional to legislative period.
Rate of innovation: number of governments where a party enters different from the preceding one.
Note: the mode is also reported because both the type of government and the reasons of termination
are nominal scales: type of government has a skewed distribution. See Mair, ‘Democracy Beyond Parties’;
Woldendorp et al., Party Government in 48 Democracies.
25 See for overviews: Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy; Keman, ‘Party Government Formation
and Policy Preferences: An Encompassing Approach?; W. Mu¨ller and K. Strøm (eds)
Coalition Governments in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
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formation. The major shortcoming is that these parsimonious approaches leave out a
number of crucial factors that direct the game:
institutions: the formal rules and conventions that constrain actors and options for
government formation and the eventual type of government to emerge;
party system dynamics: the interaction of parties and their spatial distribution in terms
of policy issues in relation to party government and its responsiveness.26
During the 1970s and 1980s these variables were integrated and elaborated in the
literature. In essence this led to two types of coalition theory, each having a different
impact on explaining government formation as such, and the likelihood of the outcome
in terms of the distribution of types of government. On the one hand, I discern policy-
Table 3. Proportion of time in government of centrist and dominant parties (%)
Centre parties in government Dominant parties in government
19701989 19902005 Change 19701989 19902005 Change
Australia 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
Austria 16.4 48.7 32.3 100.0 100.0 0.0
Belgium 55.8 26.9 29.1 100.0 100.0 0.0
Denmark 16.2 43.9 27.7 61.5 57.7 3.7
Finland 32.3 21.9 10.4 95.5 97.0 1.5
France 14.6 12.9 1.7 91.5 88.7 2.8
Germany 25.0 75.0 50.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
Greece 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 93.3 6.7
Ireland 32.1 9.0 23.1 67.5 61.7 5.8
Italy 71.7 24.0 47.7 100.0 94.3 5.7
Netherlands 56.8 39.4 17.4 87.5 91.7 4.2
New Zealand 0.0 14.6 14.6 100.0 100.0 0.0
Norway 11.5 33.3 21.8 56.5 62.7 6.2
Portugal 0.0 30.7 30.7 75.0 83.3 8.3
Spain 43.1 44.3 1.2 100.0 100.0 0.0
Sweden 17.0 33.3 16.3 57.5 66.0 8.5
Switzerland 28.6 26.7 1.9 100.0 100.0 0.0
Averages 24.8 28.5 3.7 87.8 88.0 0.2
Explanation: Centre parties in government ¼ parties occupying the centre space in a party system;
Dominant party in government¼ party with largest seat share in parliament. See Keman, The Politics of Problem-
Solving in Postwar Democracies.
Example: In the Netherlands between 1990 and 2005 39.4 per cent of the time centre parties have been in
government and 91.7 per cent of the time the largest party has been in government. Note that there is some-
times an overlap between centrist and dominant parties’ time in office.
26 Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy; Keman, ‘Centre-Space Politics: Party Behaviour in Multi-
Party Systems’.
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driven approaches,27 and on the other hand, the slow but decisive development of
institutional theories.28 In this paper both approaches will be used to discuss party
government formation and its complexities.
Policy-driven theories depart from the assumption that, in addition to the office-
seeking behaviour of parties (or power maximization), these parties are also
policy-seeking. A leading hypothesis in coalition theory is the so-called ‘least
distance’ condition (or closest neighbour). Parties prefer to share executive power
with other parties when the policy distance is smallest – that is, producing
minimal-winning connected (MCW) coalitions. This approach has led to various ela-
borations like minimal range theory, win-set theory, and so on.29 However, most of
these approaches still depart from the ‘maximization’ assumption: that is, sharing
power with as few parties as possible under the rule of having a parliamentary major-
ity. Despite the plausibility of the maximizing hypothesis, 51.7 per cent of the party
governments formed (of which almost 27.5 per cent are minority governments) could
not support it.
The institutional approach, emerging in the late 1980s, attempted to improve this
low performance of the ‘least distance’ hypothesis in empirical terms. The intro-
duction of formal rules and conventions as options and constraints of party behaviour
allowed for a better understanding of party behaviour, on the one hand, and accounted
for a higher level of empirical performance as regards the occurrence of different
types of government, on the other hand. Examples are, for instance, the rule in some
polities that the calling of an election or the resignation of a prime minister is the
prerogative of the head of state. In addition to the formal rules that help us understand
why surplus types and minority governments can and do exist is the development of
conventions in many polities (like procedural rules with regard to the formation and
functioning of coalition government) that demonstrate why outcomes of government
formation other than those expected in other theories do occur.30
A final aspect of explaining actual coalition formation in relation to the party com-
position of government is the direction and dynamics of the party system.31 Obviously,
this dimension connects the policy-driven theories with an actor-oriented approach. This
requires the policy distances between parties to be investigated, showing the divergence
or convergence of parties.32 It also shows why some parties are more important than
others in terms of occupying the central position (within the respective party
27 These replaced ‘policy blind’ theories: Budge and Keman, Parties and Democracies:
Coalition Formation and Development Functioning in 20 States.
28 Strøm et al., Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies; Michael Laver
and Ian Budge, Party Policy and Government Coalition (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992).
29 Kaare Strøm, ‘A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties’, American Journal of
Political Science, vol. 34, no. 2 (1990), pp. 56598.
30 Strøm et al., Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies; Andeweg,
‘Coalition Politics in the Netherlands: From Accommodation to Politicization’; Woldendorp
et al., Party Government in 48 Democracies.
31 Laver and Shepsle, Making and Breaking Governments.
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systems). Both elements are vital for understanding the process of government
formation as well as the actual outcome in terms of viable party government.33
In summary: the thrust of the argument is that the link between parliamentary
representation of parties and their participation in government can be theoretically and
empirically established by analysing the cross-system institutional variation influencing
the type of government and its life cycle in the countries included in the analysis.
Additionally, the relative weight of party behaviour and related policy preferences that
can be derived from party system dynamics enhances the type of government as an out-
come.34 In the next section both perspectives will be examined empirically in view of the
observed variations of party government since 1990.
Types of party government: constraints
and life cycle features
According to Arend Lijphart, the distinction between power concentration and sharing is
directly related to the different types of government: the fewer parties are in government
the more concentrated the power of a few parties (maximized if there is a single-party
government as in the UK or Canada), and, conversely, the more parties participate in
government the higher the degree of power-sharing. This feature is not only restricted
to so-called surplus coalitions (i.e. the number of parties participating exceeds the need
for parliamentary support), but is also apparent in multi-party minority government, or –
albeit to a lesser extent – to minority one-party government. In addition, if and when a
government is formed with the help of parties that tolerate government by means of for-
mal agreement it can also be considered to be power-sharing. Hence, if we ask whether
or not the results of the formation game are related to electoral changes between parties
(as for example indicated by electoral volatility: see Table 1) or are more or less repre-
sentative, then the type of government that prevails in the democracies under review is
indicative.
Table 2 shows that the type of government, and in particular coalition government,
has changed. In a number of polities this has meant a shift away from ‘surplus’ coalitions
to the MWC type (e.g. Belgium, the Netherlands, Ireland, Portugal) or towards minority
coalitions with (temporary) external support (e.g. Denmark, France, New Zealand,
Norway, Sweden and recently the Netherlands). This development is in part associated
with the diminishing dominance of the established parties (on average the vote share of
the two largest parties in parliament declined by 6.5 per cent after 1990), on the one
hand, and due to volatile electoral changes, on the other hand. However, it signifies a
32 H. Kim and R. C. Fording, ‘Government Partisanship in Western Democracies, 19451998’,
European Journal of Political Research, vol. 41, no. 2 (2002); McDonald and Budge,
Elections, Parties, Democracy: Conferring the Median Mandate.
33 P. V. Warwick, ‘Ideological Diversity and Governmental Survival in Western European
Parliamentary Democracies’, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 25 (1992), pp. 33261.
34 Paul Pennings and Jan-Erik Lane (eds) Comparing Party System Change (London:
Routledge, 1998); Schmidt, The Impact of Political Parties.
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tendency towards ‘power-sharing’ apparently not based on ‘appeasement’ or upholding
the general interest, but rather on sheer self-interest for survival.
Both the rates of ‘survival’ and ‘innovation’ are therefore also indicators of the extent
to which party government follows electoral (and party system) change, on the one hand,
and of viable intra-governmental cooperation, on the other. Alternatively, one could
argue if this is less or not the case then it may well imply that certain mechanisms (and
institutions) are conducive to a game of government formation that distorts the chain of
democratic command and control by party government.35
This chain represents the logic of representation in democracies in terms of princi-
palagent relations. Coalition theory is meant to explain the link between elections,
party systems and representative government and the underlying assumption is that
government formation in parliamentary democracies is by and large conducive to con-
gruence between the overall ideas on policy formation and does justice in this way to the
post-electoral (re)distribution of power of the parties.
This question is answered by comparing the party positions on a leftright scale with
those of the parties in government. As Figure 1 shows, the comparative differences are
apparent. In Australia, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland and to some extent
New Zealand there exists more incongruence than elsewhere (in particular in Denmark,
Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland) pointing to a gap between the overall direction of
the party system and parties in government. This variation cannot be explained by the
type of party system or by the type of government alone. It appears that a combination of
factors play a role: on the one hand, institutions that direct the executivelegislative
behaviour, on the other hand, party system characteristics.
The main institutions or ‘rules of the game’ that direct government formation, and
thus the resulting type of government, concern the role of the head of state, the support of
government required, the electoral outcome and the level of competition within par-
liament. In some polities the (often informal) rule is that a government should obtain
majority support prior to its investiture, whereas in other polities this is not the case and
therefore minority coalitions occur more frequently. Examples of the first kind are
Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain. In Germany and Spain this is a formal
rule to prevent the formation of instable government or even undemocratic rule.36 In
Belgium, Switzerland and the Netherlands it is an informal rule and a legacy of ‘con-
sociational’ practice to enhance encompassing coalitions that represented most mino-
rities.37 Interestingly enough, this informal rule appears not to be followed any more in
the Netherlands (the latest government being a minority coalition) and in Belgium it
appears to prevent a coalition being formed. In Scandinavia minority party government
occurs regularly and, according to Strøm,38 is often as viable as majority government. In
35 Katz, ‘Party Government: A Rationalistic Conception’; Budge et al., ‘Comparative Gov-
ernment and Democracy’; Keman, ‘Centre-Space Politics: Party Behaviour in Multi-Party
Systems’; Strøm et al., Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies.
36 Schmidt, Demokratietheorien.
37 Hans Keman, ‘The Low Countries: Confrontation and Coalition in Segmented Societies’, in
Josep Colomer (ed.), Comparative European Politics (London: Routledge, 2008).
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part this can be explained by how executivelegislative relations are organized: in
Scandinavian polities the so-called ‘committee’ system prevails as regards the
parliamentary decision-making procedures (where the ‘rule’ is that parliament follows
the committee recommendations). Hence different majorities can be formed for different
policy sectors and related party preferences. This is not so in New Zealand where par-
liamentary support is established by means of separate policy agreements across
different parliamentary parties prior to the investiture of a government.
In most established democracies the electoral outcome more or less directs the
subsequent process of government formation. Often the head of state plays an
active role in the initial stage of forming a government. He/she can invite the
leader of the biggest party or winner of the highest number of seats to form a
government. Yet in other systems this is self-evident without the involvement of
Figure 1. Correspondence leftright distinction of government and party system.
Congruence measure ¼ difference PS – PG; the smaller the difference the more congruence. Negative
scores ¼ to the left; positive scores ¼ to the right.
Source: Derived from I. Budge, H. D. Klingemann, A. Volkens and J. Bara, Mapping Policy Preferences: Parties,
Governments, Electors 19451998 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
38 Strøm, ‘A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties’.
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the head of state and more often than not it is the largest party that takes the first
steps. The electoral outcome can also be relevant as to what party combination(s)
are considered to be conducive to the most viable coalition. However, the extent
to which this is the case also depends on how antagonistic parties have been dur-
ing the campaign or how big the party differences are (or have become). In addi-
tion, it makes a difference whether or not ‘new’ parties have gained access to the
party system and are seen as ‘regierungsfa¨hig’.39 For instance, in Austria the right-
wing populist party FP}O have formed a coalition with the }OVP (Christian Dem-
ocrats) and in Germany the left-wing Green Party has gained access to party gov-
ernment by cooperating with the Social Democratic SPD. Conversely, in Belgium
the right-wing Flemish Block has been systematically barred from government.
This containment policy is differently conducted in Denmark and the Netherlands:
the populist parties have been accepted as support parties instead of becoming full
members of party government.40
From the above it becomes clear that rules indeed have consequences for gov-
ernment formation, and also that these rules are used differently by parties in the
various countries under review. This depends to a large extent on what position a
party has in the existing party system. As I have shown elsewhere, centrist and
larger parties in parliament tend to dominate government formation to a large extent
notwithstanding their electoral (mis)fortune: they are generally more often and
longer lasting in government.41 In Table 3 this pattern is clear, in particular for the
largest party in parliament.
It is easy to observe that being the largest party in parliament signifies a strong
position with respect to forming a government. This is less so regarding occupying
the ‘centre’ space within the party system. It appears merely a bonus in some
countries for centrist parties. However, it is not always so: after 1990 the position of
centrist parties changed in a number of polities, particularly those where Christian
Democrats have lost electoral ground in the last few decades.42 In addition to the
rise of new parties in some countries, centrist parties that lost electoral ground
became less successful (Italy being the prime example), but not always. Another
feature of Table 3 is that in some party systems there are no parties in the centre
(e.g. Australia and Greece), and also that in some countries the centre becomes
occupied (e.g. Scandinavia) at the cost of left- and right-wing parties. All this makes
clear that party system dynamics, i.e. change in party positions, influence the extent
to which patterns of party government develop over time. An important aspect of
these dynamics is not only the change in party behaviour per se, but also to what
39 ‘able to govern’, see Keman and Krouwel, ‘The Rise of a New Political Class?’
40 Peter Mair, ‘Democracy Beyond Parties’; Kris Deschouwer (ed.), New Parties in Govern-
ment: In Power for the First Time (London: Routledge, 2008).
41 Keman, ‘Parties and Government’; Keman, ‘The Search for the Centre: Pivot Parties in West
European Party Systems’.
42 Keman and Pennings, ‘Competition and Coalescence: Social Democracy and Christian
Democracy Moving into the 21st Century’.
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extent party system dynamics affect the policy-related quality of representation of
the parties in government – or what I call ‘responsiveness’.
Responsiveness and party government viability
As noted, party government can be considered to be an agent of parliament and, indirectly,
of the people. In this capacity the agent is a delegation of parliament and represents, more
often, not only the majority in parliament but also the main parties.43 Hence the more
parties are in government, the more it is an agency representing a plurality of policy
preferences within the party system. As opposed to minimal-winning coalition theories the
broader types of (coalition) government are more representative than the office-seeking
and power-concentrating types. Arend Lijphart viewed this as a better type of government
than pure majoritarian party government. In particular, single party government is, in this
view, the example of a non-representative type of government, since it represents ‘winner
takes all’. This is essentially a normative debate and often refers to the work of Arend Lij-
phart.44 Whereas Lijphart advocates broad encompassing coalitions bridging policy differ-
ences within the executive, Dahl seems to prefer pluralist interest representation that will
be conducive to policy solutions that are shaped through executivelegislative relations.
Actually these approaches do not contradict each other, but they differ where the locus
of agreement or consensus is institutionally organized if it emerges.
The agreement is that societal interests ought to be represented and can and will have
an impact on democratic decision-making. The key for examining this empirically is in
my view related to the degree of ‘responsiveness’ of both parliament and government: in
other words, to what extent parties – the principal carriers of interest representation in
any representative system – are able to translate their electoral mandate into public pol-
icy formation.45 As noted in Figure 1, the overall distinction in terms of left and right in a
party system is more and less congruent with parties in government. In Table 4 I show
the degree of responsiveness between party system and party government for specific
policy positions: on the one hand, a scale as regards state intervention and its counter-
position, neo-liberalism, is constructed. On the other hand, I use the extent to which par-
ties are more or less favourable to the maintenance or extension of the welfare state. The
more/less the differences between parliamentary parties and those in government the
more/less the (indirect) representation of certain interests appears to be.
First, the overall leftright distinction may well indicate how close (or not) party
government is to the party positions within the party system as a whole. This is obviously
not always the case. In many cases the policy preferences across the party system are
differently shaped from what a left versus right distinction would suggest (correlations
between the policy indicators and the left versus right distinction are insignificant). It may
well signify that this distinction is much more related to electoral party competition than to
43 Budge et al., ‘Comparative Government and Democracy’.
44 Arend Lijphart, Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory
And Practice (London: Routledge, 2008); Dahl, Democracy and its Critics.
45 Schmidt, The Impact of Political Parties.
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executivelegislative relations. This appears to be a plausible observation and means that
explanations for government formation should consider the policy preferences of parties to
account for both the formation of party government and its responsiveness as an agent.
It can be noted that in most systems there is ample comparative variation with
respect to the three policy indicators of responsiveness. As regards state intervention,
in only five countries is the difference between party system and party government
over 1.0 point (Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Switzerland and Spain) and is sig-
nificantly correlated to types of government. Neo-liberal ideas seem to prevail more in
government than in parliament except for five countries with Australia () and Portu-
gal (þ) at the extremes of the distribution. Welfare statism is clearly the indicator with
most variation in terms of congruence (range ¼ 6.82) with 10 cases where government
sets a higher priority regarding welfare policies. All in all, there are significant
Table 4. Party differences between political systems with party government, 19902006
Country State intervention Neo-liberalism Welfare state Left v. right
Australia 0.59 1.88 0.31 6.30
Austria 0.23 0.81 0.59 7.15
Belgium 0.05 1.22 0.86 9.08
Denmark 1.33 1.13 0.65 9.37
Finland 1.10 0.15 2.24 7.16
France 0.52 0.46 3.50 15.63
Germany 0.04 0.44 3.88 0.09
Greece 0.11 0.85 1.30 0.79
Ireland 0.63 0.06 0.16 11.62
Italy 0.19 0.94 3.26 3.70
Netherlands 0.15 1.63 0.70 2.17
New Zealand 1.19 0.01 3.48 8.11
Norway 0.10 1.37 1.37 1.01
Portugal 0.92 2.06 2.41 1.78
Spain 1.05 1.10 0.60 1.08
Sweden 0.37 0.09 1.90 3.12
Switzerland 1.19 0.27 3.94 3.04
Average 0.34 0.37 0.29 0.02
Note: Calculated using the data from Budge et al., 2001 and elaborated by Keman, ‘Parties and
Government: Incumbency and Representation in Parliamentary Democracies’. State intervention, neo-
liberalism and welfare state all concern variables in this data set. Left v. right: scale taken from Budge
et al., 2001 (and updates). The figures are the scores for all parties in parliament and those in govern-
ment respectively.
Calculation: Party system scores minus party government scores. Interpretation: if different, then party
system positions are incongruent with government positions than if negative. If positive: party system posi-
tions are stronger than for parties in government; if negative the opposite is true. For example, in New
Zealand scores of all parties are more in favour of state intervention than those of the parties in gov-
ernment. However, neo-liberalism is congruent between government and parliament.
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differences between parliament and government in relation to policy congruence in the
polities under review.
In terms of party government formation and coalition theory the question remains to
what extent its viability is influenced by its shape and form, on the one hand, and how it
performs in terms of duration and termination.46 To provide an answer to this question I
set out (on the basis of multiple regression analysis) in Table 5 the relevant relations
between indicators of the ‘life cycle’ of party government: type of government – reasons of
termination – rate of survival. I argue that, in addition to these variables, the internal
organization of party government andwelfare congruence are important for understanding
the life cycle of party governance.47
The emerging pattern is clear and altogether not very surprising: multi-party govern-
ance is more vulnerable in duration than the other way around and is more likely to be
terminated by factors other than regular elections. Yet if such governments are organized
in a more collegial way this appears to function as a countervailing factor. In other
words, the more equitable the internal organization of party government the better the
chances for a multi-party coalition to survive (e.g. in a surplus or minority coalition).
In many cases temporary policy agreements can be found within government between
the participating parties or parliament.
This argument spills over into the second model where the main reasons for termi-
nation  type of (coalition) government and the lack (or not) of congruence on welfare
statism  are relevant. The larger this gap, the more often other reasons for termination
(like unanticipated elections, dissension within government or between government and
parliament) appear to occur. This signifies that the formation of a coalition and its
policy-seeking position is crucial for its life cycle.48 This makes sense: welfare-related
Table 5. Government life cycle: type, termination, survival
Dependent Y X1 X2 R2 100
Collinearity¼
ViF score
Type of government
A ¼ 1.25*
Reason for termination
Beta ¼ 0.50*
Hierarchy government
Beta ¼ 0.43*
50.0 1.02
Reason for termination
A ¼ 1.24*
Type of government
Beta ¼ 0.42*
Welfare congruence
Beta ¼ 0.42*
47.5 1.15
Rate of survival
A ¼ 1.05*
Reason for termination
Beta ¼ 0.84**
Welfare congruence
Beta ¼ 0.06*
60.0 1.50
Note: OLS regression coefficients; A: intercept; Beta: standardized scores; * significant at 0.05; if ViF score
< 2.0 no collinearity. See Tables 2 and 4 for description and scores of the variables, but for hierarchy
government ¼ difference between collegiality and prime minister being supremo, see: H. Keman, ‘Parties and
Government: Features of Governing in Representative Democracies’, in R. Katz andW. Crotty (eds) Handbook
of Party Politics (London: Sage, 2006).
46 Keman, ‘Parties and Government’; Warwick, ‘Ideological Diversity and Governmental
Survival in Western European Parliamentary Democracies’.
47 Woldendorp et al., Party Government in 48 Democracies.
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policies are electorally sensitive and thus important for all parties, either in or out of
government.49
Finally Model 3 follows quite self-evidently from the first two models and shows
institutional factors together with the compatibility of parliament and government in
terms of policy congruence, in particular welfare statism are also relevant. The fact that
this policy sector matters is not only due to its electoral sensitivity, but can also be under-
stood as part of the prevalent urge for retrenchment within the OECD.50 I argue therefore
that both policy-seeking and office-seeking motives are central to understanding how
government formation and its subsequent ‘life’ after 1990 have been shaped and deter-
mine the viability of party government in terms of its survival.51
Conclusion
Coalition theory would strongly benefit from not only focusing on the formation process
per se, but also by integrating the subsequent life cycle of party government into the
analysis. Obviously actors – political parties – have an institutional memory, and, as
governments come and go, parties must negotiate afresh but also take into account past
experiences. This is a reiterated process where past behaviour, the extant rules of the game,
and present party positions are known to all, together with the policy performance of the
former government. The study of (coalition) government should not be viewed as a
one-shot game (as rational choice approaches tend to do) and should not be conductedwith-
out taking into account contextual variations (like social and economic changes) or the time
dimension. Finally, the coalition praxis to formanewgovernment is not only a post-electoral
‘game’ conducted within parliament and government between parties, but also a serious
exercise by parties – as agents of the electorate  to ‘translate’ policy preferences into a
viable agreement that by and large honours the voters’ choices. The fact that coalition gov-
ernment formation is a reiteratedprocess and should lead to a responsivegovernment is often
overlooked. The tentative analysis presented in this paper serves to illustrate these points.
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